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Abstract— Artificial  immune  systems,  more  specifically  the 
negative selection algorithm, have previously been applied to 
intrusion  detection.   The  aim  of  this  research  is  to  develop 
an intrusion detection system based on a novel concept in 
immunology,   the  Danger   Theory.   Dendritic   Cells  (DCs)  are 
antigen  presenting  cells and key to the activation  of the human 
immune   system.  DCs  perform  the  vital  role  of  combining 
signals  from  the  host  tissue  and  correlate these  signals  with 
proteins  known  as  antigens.  In  algorithmic   terms,  individual 
DCs perform multi-sensor  data  fusion based  on time-windows. 
The  whole  population   of  DCs  asynchronously  correlates   the 
fused signals with a secondary  data  stream.  The behaviour  of 
human  DCs is abstracted to  form  the  DC Algorithm  (DCA), 
which  is implemented using  an  immune  inspired  framework, 
libtissue. This  system  is used  to  detect  context  switching 
for  a  basic  machine  learning  dataset  and  to  detect  outgoing 
portscans in real-time. Experimental results show a significant 
difference  between  an outgoing  portscan and  normal  traffic. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Applications which monitor computer systems and net- 
works for misuse and abuse are known as intrusion detection 
systems (IDS). Misuse based IDSs use pre-defined paths and 
patterns of program execution to detect intrusions, but are 
blind to novel or variant attacks. Anomaly based intrusion 
detection  systems  on  the  other  hand  generate  profiles of 
‘normal’  behaviour [7]  [10].  Deviations from  normal  are 
classed as ‘anomalous’ and an alert is generated providing 
notification of a potential intrusion. Anomaly based systems 
can produce large amounts of false alarms (false positives), 
largely caused by the lack of environmental awareness or 
context. This paper focuses on the development of a contex- 
tually aware IDS, built on a foundation of immune inspired 
components. 
A variety of machine learning techniques has been ap- 
plied to anomaly detection, including neural networks and 
statistical learning algorithms [7]. Artificial Immune Systems 
(AIS), based on the functioning of the human immune sys- 
tem, have also been applied to anomaly detection. In 1999, 
Hofmeyr [10] developed an artificial immune system based 
on ‘negative selection’: detectors forming the normal profile 
are deleted if they match a string denoting normal behaviour. 
At the time, it was perceived to function in a similar way to 
the selection of T-lymphocyte cells in the thymus. Problems 
with negative selection were highlighted by Kim & Bentley 
[12]  and  more  recently by  Stibor  et  al  [16].  Aickelin et 
al [4] proposed that the negative selection algorithm could 
not  work  because  it  was  based  on  a  simplified  version 
of the immunological self-nonself theory. This theory has 
been challenged within immunology itself and an alternative 
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theory has been proposed - the Danger Theory [13]. The 
Danger Theory states that the immune system does not 
discriminate on the basis of self or nonself, but on the balance 
between the concentration of danger and ‘safe’ signals within 
the tissue of the body. The work described in this paper is the 
application of danger theory ideas to anomaly based intrusion 
detection. 
It is our hypothesis that the inclusion of more biologically 
realistic features alleviates some of the scaling problems and 
reduces the  amount  of  false  alerts  generated by  negative 
selection based systems. In this paper we propose and test 
an  algorithm  based  on  the  behaviour  of  DCs,  who  are 
major players in the danger theory. DCs are responsible for 
combining signals in the tissue and informing the immune 
system of any changes in signal concentration. We have used 
an  abstraction of  DC  behaviour to  develop the  DCA.  In 
this paper, we demonstrate the application of the DCA to 
two problems -  a  static machine learning problem and a 
computer security related real-time problem. This work is 
an extension of concepts and experiments described in [8]. 
We verify the correctness of the algorithm’s implementation, 
and  present experiments demonstrating real-time anomaly 
detection properties of the DCA. Further experiments are 
required to demonstrate the DCA’s effectiveness as an an 
anomaly detector in other domains. 
In this paper, Section II contains background information 
describing the biological basis for the new algorithm and 
information on the development of AIS for IDS; Section III 
briefly describes the DCA; Section IV outlines experiments 
performed on a static dataset, complete with results; Section 
V contains experimental details from testing the algorithm 
in a pre-intrusion scenario; Section VI contains results and 
analysis of the intrusion experiment; and finally, Section VII 
provides conclusions and future directions. 
 
II.  BACKGROUND 
In order to describe the algorithm it is first necessary to 
explain some of the biological concepts used and to place 
these concepts in context within the field of artificial immune 
systems. The biological basis for the functioning of DCs has 
been described in detail in our previous work [8]. Subsequent 
sections explain the relevance of the danger theory to the 
DCA and how this can be applied to intrusion detection. 
 
A. The Rise and Fall of Self-Nonself 
Until relatively recently the human immune system was 
thought to discriminate between antigens (proteins) be- 
longing to ‘self’ versus antigens belonging to pathogens - 
‘non-self’. The self-nonself theory relies on the expression 
of antigen-recognising receptors present on T-lymphocytes. 
These receptors are matched against self antigen during a 
training period in the thymus, resulting in the deletion of cells 
with the potential to interact with self antigens. Recently, 
several  questions  have  been  raised  regarding  the  validity 
of this model as a central tenet. What is defined as ‘self’ 
actually changes throughout the lifetime of an individual, e.g. 
a pregnant woman’s immune system does not react against 
her unborn foetus despite consisting of ‘nonself’ proteins. 
A modification to the self-nonself theory was proposed by 
Janeway [11], namely the ‘infectious non-self’ model. This 
states that an antigen must be associated with a PAMP 
(pathogen associated molecular patterns) in order to trigger a 
response, as recognised by the innate immune system. While 
this model could explain the rationale for adding stimulatory 
adjuvants to vaccines, it could still not answer pertinent 
questions relating to autoimmunity (e.g. Multiple Sclerosis). 
The Danger Theory [13] provides an alternative view of 
the activation of the immune system. Unlike the detection of 
non-self antigens or pathogenic molecules, the danger model 
proposes that the immune system detects the presence of 
danger signals, released as a result of necrotic cell death 
within the host tissue. Necrosis is the result of cellular dam- 
age and stress caused by pathogenic infection or exposure to 
extreme conditions. The metabolites of internal cell compon- 
ents are thought to form the danger signals and are released 
into the surround buffer fluid. The cell membrane loses its 
integrity, releasing its contents (e.g. DNA, mitochondria) into 
the surrounding tissue fluid [14]. The Danger Theory pro- 
poses that the immune system is sensitive to changes in the 
danger signal concentration in the tissue. Conversely, when 
then tissue is healthy, cells die in a controlled manner, known 
as apoptosis. Immunosuppressive molecules (safe signals) are 
released as an indicator of normality in the tissue. In essence, 
the Danger Theory consists of active suppression while the 
tissue is healthy (apopotosis), combined with rapid activation 
on receipt of necrotic danger signals. This property can be 
abstracted to form artificial  tissue, as conceptualised in a 
software framework in [17] or used for data representation 
in [6]. 
DC’s  first  function  is  to  reside  in  tissue,  where  they 
are classed as ‘immature’. Whilst in tissue, DCs collect 
antigen (regardless of the source) and experience danger 
signals from necrosing cells and ‘safe’ signals from apoptotic 
cells. Maturation of DCs occurs in response to the receipt 
of these signals. On maturation, DC exhibit the following 
behaviour: collection of antigen ceases; expression of co- 
stimulatory molecules (necessary for binding to powerful T- 
lymphocytes) and chemical messengers known as cytokines; 
migration from the tissue to a lymphatic organ such as a 
lymph node; and presenting antigen to T-lymphocytes. The 
context of the tissue (i.e. the type of signals experienced) 
is reflected in the output chemicals of the DC. If there is a 
greater concentration of danger signals in the tissue at the 
time of antigen collection, the DC will become fully mature 
(mDC), and will express mDC cytokines. Conversely, if the 
DC is exposed to ‘safe’ signals, the cell matures differently 
becoming a semi-mature DC, expressing smDC cytokines 
[15]. The mDC cytokines activate T-lymphocytes expressing 
complimentary receptors to the presented antigen. Any peri- 
pheral cells expressing that antigen type are removed through 
the activated T-lymphocyte. The smDC cytokines suppress 
the activity of any matching T-cell, inducing tolerance to 
the presented antigen. The context of the antigen is assessed 
based on the resulting cytokine expression of the DC. In 
our model, a combination of Janeway’s Infectious Non-self 
(PAMPs) model with Matzinger’s Danger model (signals) is 
used to investigate an artificial DC algorithm. 
 
B. AIS: The Story So Far 
Similarly to immunology, AIS initially relied on self- 
nonself principles to create algorithms such as negative 
selection and the B-cell based clonal expansion. Negative 
selection has been used extensively for the purpose of 
intrusion detection [5], with numerous variations for antigen 
representation. The algorithm described in [10] is used to 
generate a normal profile based on a detector set. In their 
work, network connections established by host machines are 
monitored and mapped onto a schema for matching. Their 
model uses a training period in which common connections 
are deleted from the detector set based on an activation 
threshold. Once the training period is finished, the detectors 
are compared against new connections. Connections with a 
sufficiently high  match count  to  a  particular detector are 
classed as an anomaly and an alert is generated. This al- 
gorithm has been criticised for problems with false positives 
and scaling. False positives arise because the nature of a 
machine’s  connections  can  change  over  time  as  part  of 
normal behaviour. As the detectors are not dynamically re- 
trained, once a connection rate threshold is set, any change in 
the behaviour of the machine results in the AIS responding to 
a seemingly anomalous connection. An additional problem 
is detector generation. Initially, the values for the detectors 
are created at random. As the size of the connection space 
increases,  the  size  of  the  random  detector  set  grows  at 
an unsustainable rate. This criticism has been theoretically 
validated by the work of Stibor et al [16]. 
While this algorithm advanced the development of AIS 
by stimulating further work in this field, it also hindered 
development by inspiring other algorithms to be based on 
similar, simplistic views of immunology. The Danger Project, 
initially proposed in 2003, aims to improve on the results 
of negative selection based IDSs by re-thinking the use of 
immunology within AIS. The work presented in this paper 
is the implementation of ideas outlined in this proposal [4]. 
 
III.  THE DC ALGORITHM AND libtissue 
A. The DC Algorithm 
DCs  have  a  number  of  functional  properties  that  can 
be abstracted to form a useful algorithm. The abstraction 
process, algorithm and a worked example of the signal 
processing methods are described in detail in our previous 
work [8]. Outlined below are the key characteristics of DC 
behaviour used to generate the DCA: 
W csm semi mat
PAMPs(P) 2 0 2
Danger Signals(D) 1 0 1
Safe Signals (S) 2 3 -3
(WP +WS +WD ) ∗
•  Immature DCs (iDC) collect multiple antigens and are 
exposed to signals in the tissue. 
•  DCs can combine signals from multiple sources to gen- 
erate different output concentrations of costimulatory 
molecules, semi-mature cytokines and mature cytokines. 
• Exposure to signals generates an increase in co- 
stimulatory molecules, with a high amount leading to 
migration to the lymph node. 
•  Exposure to signals causes the maturation of DCs into 
either mature and semi mature states, assessed through 
exposed to  signals, which influence the  state of  the  DC: 
immature or mature, with immature being the initial, default 
state for the cells. Transition to the mature state is facilitated 
through the CSM value. Each cell is assigned an individual 
migration CSM threshold value, which can vary between 
cells should it be required. When a cell’s CSM value exceeds 
the migration threshold, the status of the cell changes and 
migration from the tissue is initiated. 
the differences in concentration of mature and semi- 
mature cytokines. 
For the purpose of this model, a simple interpretation of 
the input signals has been derived. There are four signals 
in our model, each from a different source and producing 
different output cytokines: 
•  PAMPS (P) are based on pre-defined signatures. Expos- 
ure to PAMPS causes an increase in mDC cytokines. 
PAMPs are suppressed by safe signals. 
•  Danger signals (D) cause an increase in mDC cytokines. 
C[csm,mDC i,smDC ] = 
((WP ∗CP )+(WS ∗CS )+(WD ∗CD ))
 
 
(1) 
 
TABLE I 
WE I G H T S F O R T H E S I G NA L P RO C E S S I N G F U N C T I O N 
1+I C 
2 
Danger Signals can also be suppressed by safe signals. 
Danger signals have a lower potency than PAMPs. 
•  Safe signals (S) cause an increase in smDC cytokines 
and have a suppressive effect on both PAMPS and 
danger signals. 
•  Inflammatory cytokines (IC) amplify the effects of the 
other three signals, but are not sufficient to cause any 
effect on DCs when used in isolation. 
Our data and method of processing is very different from 
other AIS, which rely on  pattern matching of  antigen to 
drive their systems, e.g. [19]. In our algorithm, antigen is 
only used for the labelling and tracking of data, hence we 
do not have a similarity metric. The representation of the 
antigen  can  be  a  string  of  either  integers  or  characters. 
Signals are represented as real-valued numbers, proportional 
to values derived from the context information of the dataset 
in use. For example, a danger signal may be an increase 
in CPU usage of a computer. The value for the CPU load 
can  be  normalised within  a  range  and  converted into  its 
real-valued  signal  concentration  value.  The  signal  values 
are combined using a weighted function (Equation 1) with 
suggested values of the weights derived from empirical data 
based on immunologists’ wet lab results (Dr Julie McLeod, 
Dr Rachel Harry and Charlotte Williams - University of the 
West of England). 
The function itself is a weighted sum of PAMP, danger 
and safe signal concentration values, multiplied by a value 
for inflammation (in the range of 0 and 2). The resulting 
value is  then normalised through division by the sum of 
the weights. The function is used three times to calculate 
the  output  cytokines of  costimulatory molecules (CSMs), 
mDC and smDC cytokines, as denoted. C represents a 
concentration, with the subscript denoting the cytokine or 
signal  it  represents  (P, D, S, I C  are  PAMP,  danger,  safe 
and inflammatory signals). Similarly, W  corresponds to the 
weights used. These values are updated each time a DC is 
The DCA is a population based algorithm, with a user 
defined number of DCs created to form a sampling pool. 
While in the sampling pool, each DC is exposed to current 
signal values and selects a slot in the antigen store. If an 
antigen is present in the antigen store, the DC collects the 
antigen and ingests it in the DC internal antigen storage. 
Each DC has the opportunity to sample multiple antigens. For 
every iteration of antigen collection, each DC re-calculates its 
internal cytokine values based on the input signals received. 
Each antigen can be sampled single or multiple times (a 
tunable parameter). 
Migration is simulated by the removal of a DC from the 
pool and occurs when the cell’s internal CSM value exceeds 
the DC’s migration threshold. At this point, the output 
cytokines of each DC are measured. Antigen presented by 
cells predominantly expressing mature cytokines is labelled 
‘mature context antigen’, whilst antigen from cells expressing 
predominantly semi-mature cytokines is labelled as ‘semi- 
mature’. Each presented antigen’s context is recorded and 
eventually a mean antigen context value (between 0 and 1) 
is derived. Further details of the DCA can be found in [8]. 
 
B. System Integration 
libtissue  [17] is a software system which allows the 
implementation and testing of AIS algorithms on real-world 
computer security problems. Its design comes from detailed 
research into innate immunology [18] and computer security. 
It allows researchers to implement AIS algorithms as a 
collection of cells, antigen and signals, interacting within a 
tissue compartment. Input data to the tissue compartment 
comes in the form of real-time events generated by sensors 
monitoring a system under surveillance. Cells are actively 
able to affect the monitored system through response mech- 
anisms, though none are relevant to the DCA. 
The  system  has  a  client/server architecture pictured  in 
Figure 1. The AIS algorithm is implemented as a libtissue 
server, while libtissue clients provide input data to the al- 
gorithm and provide response mechanisms. This client/server 
architecture separates data collection by the libtissue 
clients  from  data  processing  by  the  libtissue servers. 
Client and server APIs exist, allowing new antigen and signal 
sources to be easily added to libtissue servers, and the 
testing of the same algorithm with a number of different 
data sources. Client/server communication is socket-based 
and uses the SCTP protocol, allowing clients and servers to 
potentially run on separate machines, for example a signal 
client may in fact be a remote network monitor. 
libtissue clients  are  of  three  types:  antigen,  signal 
and response. Antigen clients collect data and transform it 
into antigen which are forwarded to a libtissue server. 
Currently, a systrace antigen client has been implemented 
which collects process system calls using systrace [3]. Sys- 
tem calls are a low-level mechanism by which applications 
request system services such as peripheral I/O or memory 
allocation from an operating system. Signal clients monitor 
system behaviour and provide the AIS with input signals. 
receptors and producers which allow cells to interact with 
others cells, antigen and signals in the tissue compartment. 
Currently, four types of receptors have been implemented: 
antigen, cytokine, cell and vr receptors. Antigen receptors 
allow cells to transfer antigen from the tissue compartment 
to their own internal antigen store. Cytokine receptor allow 
cells to read signal levels in the compartment. Cell receptors 
allow cells to bind to other cells. Binding is necessary for vr 
receptors, which match antigen presented on another cell, to 
be activated. Antigen from a cell’s internal store are presented 
on antigen producers, one of the three types of producers 
currently implemented. The other two types, cytokine and 
response producers, allow cells to change cytokine levels 
in the tissue compartment and communicate with response 
clients respectively. 
 
 
 
clients  server 
compartment 
A process signal client, which monitors a process and its 
children and  records statistics such as  CPU and memory 
usage, and a network signal client, which monitors network 
interface  statistics  such  as  bytes  per  second,  have  also 
been implemented. Currently, response clients which directly 
modify a systrace system call policy and generate alerts are 
antigen 
systrace 
response 
signal 
signal  collector 
antigen store 
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signal store 
also  implemented. These  clients are  designed to  be  used 
in real-time experiments and for data collection for offline 
experiments. 
The implementation is designed to allow varied AIS 
algorithms to be evaluated on real-world systems and 
problems[17]. When testing IDSs it is common to use preex- 
isting datasets such as the Lincoln Labs dataset [1]. However, 
our project is focused on combining measurements from a 
number of different concurrent data sources. Pre-existing data 
sets are not available containing the necessary data for our 
system. To facilitate experimentation, a replay client has also 
been implemented. This client reads in log files gathered 
from previous real-time runs of antigen and signal clients. It 
also has the facility to read logfiles generated by strace [2] as 
an optional source of antigen in place of the systrace client. It 
then sends these logs to a libtissue server. Variable replay 
rates are available, allowing data collected from a real-time 
session to be used to perform many experiments quickly. 
The  libtissue server  itself  provides  a  programming 
environment in which AIS algorithms can be implemented. 
Input data  for  these algorithms comes from  data  sources 
provided by connected libtissue clients and is represented 
in a tissue compartment. A tissue compartment is a space 
in which cells, signals and antigen interact. Each tissue 
compartment has a fixed-size antigen store where antigen 
provided by libtissue clients is placed. The tissue com- 
partment also stores levels of signals, set either by signal 
tissue clients or cells. 
libtissue cells, like tissue compartments, have antigen 
and  signal  stores.  They  also  have  a  number  of  different 
Fig. 1.    libtissue System Architecture 
 
 
IV.  WISCONSIN BREAST CANCER DATA 
 
Previous work with the  DCA included preliminary ex- 
periments using the Wisconsin Breast Cancer dataset [9] to 
form the signals and antigen, and produced class switching 
behaviour in the DCs. Here we repeat and extend these 
experiments to verify the implementation of the DCA within 
the libtissue framework [8]. 
The Wisconsin Breast Cancer dataset [9] consists of 700 
items: 240 items in class 0, 460 in class 1 and with each data 
item containing nine normalised attributes. The static nature 
of  the  dataset  enables  testing  for  detection accuracy and 
provides two different data contexts which can be ‘replayed’. 
Although we are aware that using static data to test an 
intrusion detection algorithm is not ideal, it nevertheless 
provides a predictable test-bed for examining the algorithm 
itself. The antigen context output of the DCA classifies the 
data into class 0 or class 1. This value is then compared 
against the original classification and the number of errors 
recorded. 
 
A. Signals and Antigen 
 
In  our  experiments, five out  of  the  nine  attributes  are 
used to form the signals. The five attributes with the largest 
standard deviation are chosen. Cell shape, bare nuclei and 
normal nucleoli are danger signals. Clump size has the 
highest standard deviation out of all attributes and is used 
to calculate PAMP and safe signal values for each data item. 
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The PAMP and safe signal value equals the deviation from 
the mean of the class [8]. 
The signal concentration values are accumulated and pro- 
cessed within each DC using the weighted signal processing 
function described in Section III. Weightings used for this 
experiment are derived from empirical immunology and are 
shown in Table 1. The total signal values form the basis of 
discrimination for the detection of context changes in the 
original data. 
In this experiment we have not included values for in- 
flammatory cytokines, as no suitable mapping exists. Antigen 
provides a label for each data item. A migration threshold for 
removal from the sampling pool is implemented. Once this 
threshold is exceeded, a DC is removed from the sampling 
pool and its antigen plus context is written in a log file. 
Once all the data items are processed the log file is analysed. 
The number of ‘mature’ and ‘semi-mature’ presentations per 
antigen is calculated. Ultimately, a mean value is calculated 
from the context data. A threshold reflecting the distribution 
of the original data is used to discern between antigens 
presented in a class 0 or class 1 context. Values exceeding 
the threshold are categorised as class 1. 
 
B. Tissue Clients and Parameters 
random distribution. A further experiment is performed using 
the two-step data order where each antigen is sampled only 
once, not 10 times as in previous experiments. The migration 
threshold for each DC is generated randomly within the range 
of 5-15 (mean value of 10). 
The series 2 experiments use the one-step data order to 
assess the effect of changing the migration threshold value. 
The migration threshold value limits the amount of antigen 
a  DC  can  collect. A  larger migration threshold increases 
the  sampling window size for  antigen collection. We  are 
interested to see what effect variations of this value have on 
the amount of errors produced by the system. The migration 
threshold is fixed at 1, 5, 10, 15 and compared to the 
previously used random number within the range of 5-15. 
Each experiment is run 20 times with the context values for 
each antigen derived from the mean of all runs. 
 
D. The Results 
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TABLE II 
TI S S U E SE RV E R PA R A M E T E R SE T T I N G S 
 
Parameter Breast Cancer Expts Port Scan Expts
Tissue antigen capacity 
Cell antigen capacity Number 
of DCs in pool Antigen 
sampling probability Signal 
decay rate 
Cell cycle rate 
Number of times a single 
antigen is sampled 
1 antigen 
50 antigen 
100 DCs 
0.10 
100% 
1 sample/s 
10 
500 antigen
50 antigen 
500 DCs 
1.00 
100% 
1 sample/s 
1 
 
C. Experiments 
Two series of experiments are performed using the cancer 
dataset, with all experiments performed on a Debian Linux 
machine (kernel 2.4.10, AMD Athlon 1GHz). All code is 
implemented in C (gcc 4.0.2). Each experiment is performed 
20 times, with 7000 antigen collected per run. The context 
values from each run are used to derive an overall mean 
context value for each antigen. A threshold of 0.65 (reflective 
of the class distribution of the dataset) is used to determine 
the final class label of each antigen. Antigen with context 
values of over 0.65 are designated class 1 and vice versa. 
Experimental series 1 explores the class-switching beha- 
viour of the DCs by investigating the influence of the data 
order. Three data orders are explored: class 0 followed by 
class  1  (one-step);  the  first half  of  class  0,  all  of  class 
1, followed by the remainder of class 0 (two-step); and a 
Fig. 2.    The experiment shown features a one step data order (n=20). The 
data set contains 240 data items of class 0 followed by 460 class 1 items. 
The context switching of DCs is demonstrated in accordance with change 
in the data. 
 
The results from series 1 are shown in Figure 2 and in 
Table III. Figure 2 shows the class switching behaviour of the 
DCs from class 0 to class 1 in line with the data order. These 
results produce comparable trends with previous results[8]. 
However, there is some loss of accuracy as seen from the 
increased amount of errors listed in Table III. This is due 
to  the  addition  of  new  components in  libtissue,  such 
as antigen overwriting and random selection of cells in the 
update cycle of the DCs. When each antigen is sampled once, 
the results for the 2-step experiment improve as shown in 
Table III. This is due to the strong linkage between antigen 
and signals in this experimental set-up. As expected when 
the data order is completely random the performance of the 
algorithm is poor, due to the lack of linkage between antigen 
and signals. 
 
TABLE III 
NU M B E R O F E R RO R S F O R E AC H DATA  O R D E R 
The  results  from  series  2  are  presented  in  Table  IV. 
The results show that variation in the migration threshold 
significantly alters the classification of data items (using a 
paired t-test, p < 0.01) around the class-switch boundary. 
Analysis based on the number of errors suggests that CSM=1 
is the best value for the threshold. However, the magnitude of 
the errors generated using CSM=1 (error values not reported) 
is greater than those reported when CSM=5, making CSM=5 
a more suitable value. The variable threshold was expected 
to perform within the same range as CSM=10, being the 
mean of the random range. However, the number of errors 
produced using CSM=variable was smaller than expected 
and significantly different to the results from CSM=10. The 
variable threshold adds robustness to the system; furthermore 
a set value need not be specified, as long as the values fall 
within a sensible range. 
 
TABLE IV 
NU M B E R O F E R RO R S F O R E AC H DATA  O R D E R 
 
Migration Threshold Number of Errors 
1 
5 
10 
15 
Variable 
14 
41 
83 
182 
57 
 
 
V.  PORT SCAN EXPERIM ENTS 
Port scanning is used primarily for network administration 
and consists of sending packets to machines for the purpose 
of understanding the topography of a network. However, this 
tool is often used for malicious purposes to search out vul- 
nerable machines. Detection of port scans is a key step in the 
detection of an attack and makes an ideal small scale, real- 
time experiment for testing the DCA. An essential purpose 
of this experiment is to ensure the tissue server, clients and 
algorithm can cope with real-time data processing. 
B. Signals and Antigen 
Process IDs from all processes running through the remote 
shell are captured using a systrace tissue client, as described 
in Section III. The process IDs are the antigen of the system 
and are classed as either ‘semi-mature’ or ‘mature’ dependent 
on the percentage of DCs expressing an antigen with mature 
cytokines. The  proportion of  mature context antigen (per 
process) are used to identify misbehaving processes. This 
context is generated by exposing the DCs to various signals 
representative of machine behaviour. Signals have been se- 
lected to reflect a network based attack. An ‘ideal’ PAMP 
would be a signature or definite indicator of a pathogenic 
presence. In this instance the number of ICMP ‘destination 
unreachable’ errors are converted into PAMP signals. These 
signals are generated if a scanned IP address does not have 
an associated machine - a potential sign of port scanning. 
The amount of packets transmitted per second is measured 
and  forms the  danger signals. The  higher the  amount of 
packets per second, the greater the concentration of the 
danger signal. The safe signals are viewed as the opposite of 
danger signals. Safe signals are derived from the inverse rate 
of change of packets per second, based on a moving average 
over a 2 second time window. 
Inflammatory signals are reflective of the machine beha- 
viour in general, but not specific to the scan. In this instance, 
the inflammatory signal was set to zero to indicate ‘user 
present’ or set to 1 to simulate ‘user absent’. This is based 
on the assumption that it is less likely to comply as normal 
data should a port scan take place without a user present 
at the machine. An example of the incoming signals to the 
tissue server is shown in Figure 3. 
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A. The ICMP scan 
The port scan used is a ping (ICMP) scan performed across 
a range of IP-addresses, using the nmap  tool. In order to 
perform this port scan, a remote shell (via ssh on a selected 
port, 2222) is established, from which nmap is executed, 
providing an example of anomalous behaviour. To capture 
normal behaviour, a file transfer is performed from the host 
machine to another, in addition to ssh demon processes and 
shells running in  the  background. The port scan and  the 
file transfer are not performed simultaneously, to allow for 
a  baseline  of  comparison. Four  different  experiments are 
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performed varying the combinations of the different signals 
and the safe signal weighting for the mature cytokine value. 
The protocol describing the port scan procedure is as follows: 
•  Remotely log-in to host using ssh port 2222 
•  Run the nmap (nmap   -sP), ICMP scanning over 1000 
IP addresses 
•  Wait for 30 seconds 
•  Transfer a file from the host machine (3.3MB) 
•  Close the remote session 
Fig. 3.    The PAMPs, danger signal and safe signal inputs. 
 
C. Parameters,  Settings and Scripts 
The parameters used in this experiment are shown in Table 
II. All experiments were performed using nmap version 3.2.1 
on an AMD Athlon machine (1GHZ) running Debian Linux 
kernel version 2.6.10. OpenSSH version 4.2 was used for the 
remote shell, with all code written in C (gcc version 4.0.2). 
Signal collection scripts are written in bash to extract relevant 
  
data from the /proc file system, in addition to the use of 
the netstat program. These samples were taken once per 
second. Each experiment was performed ten times, with the 
mean percentage of mature antigen calculated to assess the 
anomalous or normal nature of the individual processes. A 
process monitor script is used to capture which processes 
have run throughout the course of the experiment for the 
purpose of antigen identification. Forked or child process IDs 
are also captured. 
Experiments  with  the  port-scan  tissue  clients  are  per- 
formed using different combinations of signals. A summary 
of the experiments is detailed in Table V. As PAMPs did not 
feature in experiment 1, the weighting for the transformation 
of safe signals to CSMs was changed from -3 to -1. In these 
experiments all other weighting values are as described in 
Table I. This weighting was increased to -2 for experiments 
3  and 4  to  explore the  relationship between detection of 
normal processes and an increase in safe signal suppression. 
In experiment 4, the inflammatory signal was used for the 
first time, to assess the usefulness of the signal. A summary 
of the experiments performed is detailed in Table V. 
 
TABLE V 
PO RT SC A N EX P E R I M E N T S 
 
Experiment Signal Types Safe Signal to CSM Weight
1 
2 
3 
4 
danger & safe 
danger, safe & PAMP 
danger, safe & PAMP 
danger, safe, PAMP 
& inflammation 
-1 
-1 
-2 
-2 
 
 
VI.  PORT SCAN RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
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0.6 
2 sigs -1 
3 sigs -1 
TABLE VI 
TWO SI G NA L S (EX P T 1) 
 
Process Name Num antigen Mean % mAg Std Dev
ssh script
sshd -p 2222 
sshd:jqg[priv] 
sshd:jqg[net] 
sshd:jqg[pam] 
bash 
sshd jqg@pts/8 
nmap -sP 
X forward agt 
scp blufire.ai
10.4
31.9 
246.2 
26.7 
10.4 
293.6 
476.0 
3536.4 
471.7 
285.3 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0.205 
0.437 
0.843 
0.297 
0.378 
0
0 
0.002 
0 
0 
0.159 
0.090 
0.069 
0.115 
0.157 
 
 
TABLE VII 
TH R E E S I G NA L S W I T H -1 SA F E S I G NA L W E I G H T I N G (EX P T 2) 
 
Process Name Mean % mAg Standard Deviation
bash
sshd jqg@pts/8 
nmap -sP 
X forward agt 
scp blufire.ai 
0.212 
0.441 
0.910 
0.421 
0.428 
0.152
0.159 
0.0456 
0.176 
0.187 
 
 
 
tables, Tables VII, VIII and IX respectively. The tables show 
the mean percentage mature antigen for each process in 
addition to the standard deviation from the mean, found to be 
reflective of the actual data distribution. The five processes 
of  interest  presented  in  Figure  4  include:  the  bash  shell 
from which the scan was performed; the ssh demon; the 
nmap performing the  port scan; the  graphical forwarding 
agent for the remote shell; and the file transfer (scp). The 
scp file transfer provides us with a baseline comparison. If 
the DCA works correctly, nmap is expected to produce a 
significantly greater mean % mature antigen than the file 
transfer. Indeed, analysis of data from all experiments shows 
that  nmap  produces  significantly greater  mean  %  mature 
antigen than the baseline normal file transfer (see Table X), 
especially in experiment 3. This is true for any combination 
of signals. Furthermore, the mean % mature antigen for the 
normal file transfer is significantly reduced when the safe 
signal weight is changed to -2. All significance are assessed 
0.5 
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0.1 
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bash sshd jqg@pts/8 nmap -sP X forward agt scp blufire.ai 
Process type 
3 sigs -2 
4 sigs -2 through paired t-tests, with 95% confidence demonstrated. 
 
A. Analysis 
In each experiment the nmap process generates signific- 
antly more mature context antigen than any other process, 
as  shown through the paired t-test results given in  Table 
X. The standard deviations of these results are within an 
acceptable range indicating that all means are representative 
of the sample. The good detection rate of the anomalous 
Fig. 4.    The mean % mature antigen derived for each process of interest, 
shown for each signal combination. 
 
In  experiment  1,  all  process  IDs  presented  as  antigen 
are analysed and a mean percentage mature antigen value 
(%  mAg) is calculated. The results in Table VI show that 
although antigen is presented for numerous sshd processes, 
negligible amounts are detected as dangerous. Similar values 
are  found for  experiments 2,  3  and  4  and  thus  the  sshd 
child processes are omitted from the corresponding results 
process indicates that the DCA may be suitable as a general 
purpose anomaly detector. The addition of PAMPs does not 
significantly increase the detection of the ‘anomalous’ nmap 
(p > 0.05), but combined with a higher safe signal weight, 
significantly lowers the % mature antigen value of the normal 
processes. This implies that in future experiments a much 
higher level of  safe signal can be  used without reducing 
the detection of the misbehaving process. This in turn may 
reduce  the  amount  of  false  positives in  comparison with 
Process Name Mean % mAg Standard Deviation
bash 
sshd jqg@pts/8 
nmap -sP 
X forward agt 
scp blufire.ai 
0.107 
0.271 
0.829 
0.172 
0.176 
0.115 
0.077 
0.083 
0.203 
0.196 
TABLE VIII 
TH R E E SI G NA L S W I T H -2 WE I G H T (EX P T 3) 
TABLE X 
CO M PA R I S O N O F A N O M A L O U S N M A P A N D N O R M A L S E C U R E C O P Y (S C P ) 
BA S E D O N D I S TA N C E O F M E A N % M AT U R E A N T I G E N 
 
Experiments distance of means p value
2 signals (-1 ss)
3 signals (-1 ss) 
3 signals (-2 ss) 
4 signals (-2 ss)
0.465 
0.482 
0.652 
0.448 
<0.001
<0.001 
<0.001 
<0.001 
 
TABLE IX 
FO U R SI G NA L S (EX P T 4) 
 
Process Name Mean % mAg Standard Deviation
bash 
sshd jqg@pts/8 
nmap -sP 
X forward agt 
scp blufire.ai 
0.103 
0.423 
0.796 
0.319 
0.348 
0.054 
0.121 
0.139 
0.160 
0.227 
 
 
 
previous AIS intrusion detection systems. 
It is also interesting to note that the inclusion of inflammat- 
ory signals in experiment 4 produces an increase in the de- 
tection of the normal process (0.348 %mAg) when compared 
to experiment 3 (0.176 %mAg). On closer inspection of the 
output data we discovered that fewer antigen are presented 
per DC (0.25 antigen per DC) versus 0.42 antigen per DC in 
all three previous experiments. Two implications are evident 
from these results: First, DCs spend a shorter time in the 
tissue as the CSM threshold is exceeded at twice the rate; 
second, as the DC spend less time in the tissue, less antigen 
is collected. This is analogous to the effects of inflammation 
in the human immune system. 
 
VII.  CONCLUSIONS AND FURTHER WORK 
 
In this paper we have demonstrated the use of a Dend- 
ritic Cell inspired Algorithm (DCA) on two datasets. The 
results from the Wisconsin Breast Cancer experiments have 
validated the use of the algorithm within the libtissue 
framework. The promising results shown in the port scan 
experiments imply that the DCA plus the libtissue frame- 
work can be used for the purpose of anomaly detection under 
real-time conditions. 
Future work includes the incorporation of the replay client 
outlined in Section III. This client will allow us to collect 
more  data  of  our  choice,  and  to  study  the  behaviour of 
the DCA in detail. Sensitivity analysis performed using the 
replay client will give us greater understanding of the DCA, 
necessary before any further development of the algorithm. A 
suitable method of comparison with other anomaly detection 
techniques is also under investigation. Ultimately, we would 
like to  apply this data to  real-time system monitoring to 
detect exploits, botnets or scanning worms. Results from this 
will assist in deriving an answer to the original question[4]: 
is Danger Theory the missing link between AIS and IDS? 
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